10-FATALITY 1924 CRASH OF KEY SYSTEM AND SAN FRANCISCO-SACRAMENTO TRAINS

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE INVESTIGATION OF AN

ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE LINE OF THE KEY SYSTEM TRANSIT COMPANY AT

OAKLAND, CALIF., DECEMBER 4, 1924

JANUARY 12, 1925.

TO THE COMMISSION:

On December 4, 1924, there was a rear-end collision between a passenger train of the Key System

Transit Company and a passenger train of the San Francisco-Sacramento Railroad on the line of the Key

System Transit Company at Oakland, Calif., which resulted in the death of 8 passengers nod 2 employees off

duty, and the injury of 36 passengers and 2 employees. The investigation of this accident was conducted

jointly with the Railroad Commission of the State of California.

LOCATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION

The Key System Transit line is an electric railway using 600 volts direct current for propulsion

purposes; it comprises street-car lines in Oakland and other cities in the East Bay district, and the Key

Division, on which this accident occurred, on which trains are operated from junction points with the

street-car lines to the Key System Pier Terminal, located 3.85 miles west of San Pablo Avenue, Oakland.

At the pier connections are made with ferryboats which are operated to Market Street, San Francisco. In

order to reduce the number of train unit operations on the Key Division it is the practice to consolidate

trains in each direction between junction points and the Pier Terminal and the trains on this division

consist of from one to as many as eight cars. Trains of the San Francisco-Sacramento Railroad are also

operated over the Key System tracks from Fortieth Street and Shafter Avenue to the Pier Terminal. The

operation of these trains between those points is tinder the supervision and control of the Key System

Transit Company.

That part of the Key System line on which this accident occurred is located upon a fill extending

into San Francisco Bay. It is a double-track line equipped with an automatic block-signal system combined

with an automatic train-stop system. The signals are of the three-position, upper-quadrant type and the

automatic train stop is of the overhead mechanical trip type. Alternating current control circuits and

single-rail track circuits are used. The signals are mounted on center trolley poles and the automatic stop

arm is connected to the spectacle casting of each signal and operates simultaneously therewith. When the

signal is in the danger position the stop arm is in position to engage the arm of a valve located on the car

roof. Should the car pass a signal and a. stop arm in this position the valve is automatically operated to

cause an emergency application of the air brakes. In the vicinity of the point of accident trolley poles are

spaced 105 feet apart and signals and automatic stops are installed on each fourth pole, or 420 feet apart.

A full-block overlap is provided by the control circuits, which tire, arranged to display one caution and

two step signals behind each train. The, arrangement of signals, in this vicinity is intended to provide for

the movement of trains trader a headway of 45 seconds and was designed to provide adequate braking distance

for Key System trains which with the propulsion current used are operated at a maximum speed of

approximately 36 miles an hour and at this speed require, a distance of from 300 to 350 feet in which to

stop.

Signal 104 is located 11,321 feet west of signal 46 at tower No. 2. Approaching the point of

accident from signal 46 the track is tangent for a distance of 6,197 feet, then there is a 30' curve to the

right

633.72 feet in length, followed by 4,491 feet of tangent to signal 104, the tangent extending a considerable

distance beyond that signal. The accident occurred practically opposite signal 104, located at a point about

1 1/4 miles cast of the Pier Terminal, at about 7.54 a.m.

At the time of this accident a light rain was falling and the range, of clear vision was limited to

a distance of approximately one-half mile.

DESCRIPTION

The trains involved in this accident were Key System westbound train No. 729 and San

Francisco-Sacramento westbound train No. 15. Train No. 729 was a consolidated train of the Oakland Twelfth

Street line and consisted of four center entrance motor cars, Nos. 655, 656, 664 and 665 in the order named,

with Conductor Noone and Motorman Compton in charge. The motorman of this train reached a Caution Signal

indication, at signal 104 on account of preceding (rains being delayed due to switching operations at the

Pier Terminal. Approaching this signal Motorman Compton shut off power and when about opposite pole 106

applied the brakes for the purpose of bringing his train to a stop; the train stopped with the head end some

distance east of signal 100, which was in the stop position, and the rear and practically opposite signal

104. While standing at this point the rear end of this train was struck by San Francisco-Sacramento train

No. 15.

San Francisco-Sacramento train No. 15 consisted of motor car 1014 and was in charge of Conductor

Knoblock and Motorman Brubaker; this train was en route from Concord, Calif., to Oakland Pier Terminal.

The last stop made prior to the accident was at tower No. 2 on the Key Division, where it was stopped at

signal 46 and held until two Key System trains had proceeded toward the pier. After train No. 729 had

cleared, the route was lined up for train No. 15; that train then proceeded toward the pier and while

running at an estimated speed of about 20 miles an hour collided with the rear end of Key System train No.

729, which was standing near signal 104.

Motor car 1014 telescoped the rear car of train No. 729 for a distance of 18 1/2 feet. It came to

a stop with the head end of car 1014 at a point 31 feet west of signal 104, and the rear end of car 665, the

last car of train No. 729, was 18 feet 6 inches west of signal 104.

Car 665 was constructed with steel underframe, steel side frame and steel body plates, having

wooden lining and wooden roof construction. It was 7 feet 7 1/2 inches long, weighed 60,000 pounds, and the

distance from top of rail to top of 8-inch buffer beam was 48 inches. The rear portion of this car was

practically demolished, the damage probably being due in part, at least, to the fact that the floor line and

top of the body butlers were lower than the floor and buffers on the San Francisco-Sacramento ear. Motor

car 1014 was of steel-underframe construction, having wooden superstructure. It was 57 feet 10 inches long,

weighed 93,260 pounds, and the distance from top of rail to top of 8-inch butler beam was 53 inches. The

platform of this car over rode the floor of the Key System car. The forward end of car 1014 and a partition

7 feet from the head end were demolished, pipe. connections and other equipment broken or torn from the car,

and the truck on the damaged end was driven backward about 10 feet, bending foundation brake gear rods and

causing other damage. The trading pair of wheels of this truck was derailed.

Key System car 665 telescoped by car 1014; signal pole 104 opposite car 1014.

Interior of car 665 after separation from car 1014.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

The employees injured were Motorman Brubaker and Conductor Knoblock, of train No. 15. Motorman

Brubaker, on advice, of counsel, refused to testify and declined to give, a statement of any character, on

the ground that anything he might say could be used against hint in criminal proceedings which were thought

to be pending.

Motorman Compton, of train No. 729, stated that on the morning of the accident there, was a light

rain but the view was good. When he had reached a point practically opposite signal 108, he, saw that signal

104 was in the caution position; he shut off power, made a full service application of the, air brakes, and

had no difficulty in bringing his train to a stop before reaching signal 100, which was in stop position. He

stated he immediately sounded a whistle signal for the flagman to go back and then released the brakes;

within 30 or 35 seconds after stopping he felt the shock of the impact, which moved his train forward a

distance of 3 to 4 feet. Motorman Compton said the head end of his train stopped at a point about 130 feet

east of signal 100 and he thought the, rear end cleared signal 101 by a few feet. He stated the reason he

stopped at that distance from signal 100 was because he made a full service application in order to be

certain that his train would not pass the signal, and had he released so as to approach nearer to it before

stopping he probably would have, overrun the signal. In making this stop he stated that he shut off power as

soon as he saw the caution signal, at which time he was running at full speed, and made, a brake application

at about the second pole cast of the caution signal.

Conductor Noone, of train No. 729, stated that approaching the point where the accident occurred

his train was running at a speed of from 30 to 35 miles an hour, and that it came to a stop with the rear end

extending slightly east of signal 104. He was in the rear car of his train. As soon as the train stopped the

motorman sounded the whistle signal for the flagman to go back; he took up flagging equipment, got out the

center door on the left-hand side of the ear and started back, but the collision occurred before he reached

the rear end of his train and without his having seen the approaching train.

Brakeman Hamma, of train No. 729, stated that when his train stopped near signal 100 he was

collecting fares in the leading car of the, train. He estimated the time of impact at about 30 seconds after

his train came to a stop.

Brakeman Van Dalsen, of train No. 729, was, in the third car from the head end, and had finished

collecting fares. He also estimated that the shock of collision came about 30 seconds after the train came

to a stop, and thought his train was moved forward a distance of about 4 feet.

Motorman Hobson, who as deadheading on train No. 729, was riding in the motorman's compartment of

the third car from the head end. He stated that as soon as the train stopped Motorman Compton sounded the

whistle, signal for the flagman to go back; he raised the cab window and on looking toward the rear saw train

No. 15 about two car lengths from the rear of train No. 729, moving at a speed which he estimated to be

about 30 miles an hour. He realized at once that a collision was unavoidable and as there was not sufficient

time to let out he braced himself and waited for the shock of impact.

Conductor Knoblock, of train No. 15, stated that from Concord to Fortieth Street, Oakland, his

train consisted of two cars; at the latter point the rear car was cut off and they proceeded toward the Pier

Terminal with one car, which was in good operating condition. Their train was stopped at tower No. 2

because, of signal 46 being set against them, and he saw train No. 729 leave that point, his own train

following about 1 1/2 minutes later. He stated his train made the usual speed between tower No. 2 and the

point of accident and he did not see train No. 729 after leaving the tower until just before the collision

occurred. Approaching the, point of accident the motorman made, a service application of the brakes, which

was followed very closely by an emergency application clue to the automatic train stop valve arm striking the

trip arm operated in connection with the signal. He heard the exhaust of air from the automatic stop valve

and the emergency application of the brakes resulting therefrom threw him off his balance. He then looked

forward and saw the rear of train No. 729 only about two-car lengths ahead. Conductor Knoblock estimated

that when the service application was made by the motorman the speed of his train -was from 35 to 40 miles an

hour, and he thought that perhaps 30 seconds elapsed before the emergency application occurred. After the

emergency application he thought the brakes locked the wheels as the call seemed to slide forward until the

impact of collision came. Conductor Knoblock stated that Motorman Brubaker operated train No. 15 from Rock

Ridge to the point of accident: he had no conversation with the motorman except a word or two when he got on

the train at Rock Ridge, bat there was nothing out of the ordinary in connection with the operation of the

train between Rock Ridge, and the point of accident.

Motorman Willis, of the train which followed train No. 15 westward from tower No. 2 on the morning

of the accident, stated that he operated his train under clear signals at a speed of about 30 miles per hour.

He stated his range of vision extended for at least half a mile, and after passing through the subway under

the Southern Pacific, Railroad west of tower No. 2, train No. 15 was constantly in view until the time,

of. the accident. He thought that, train was running at a higher rate of speed than he was able to attain.

Motormen on other trains which were being operated over this line on the morning of the accident

stated that the rain did not obscure signals, and that, although the rails were wet, they had he difficulty

in properly controlling and stopping their trains in accordance with signal indications.

Towerman Corker, who was on duty at tower No. 2, stated that when train No. 15 arrived at his

tower it was held about one minute to allow train No. 729 to leave in its regular turn. Train No. 15 left

tower No. 2 as soon as the switches were lined up for its route, the signal cleared, and the flagman

recalled, which he thought was about 45 seconds after the departure of train No. 729. No exact record of the

time of departure of trains from that point is kept.

Electrical Engineer Bell, of the Key System Transit Company, stated that the signal circuits are

so arranged that when it train receives a clear signal indication the signal remains in clear position until

the last pair of wheels passes the insulated joint in the track located practically opposite the signal. The

purpose of this arrangement is to prevent the signal and automatic stop arm from assuming the danger position

until the arms of the automatic stop valves on all cars in the train have passed the signal. He stated that

the body of a Key System car overhangs the rear axle a distance of about 7 feet 6 inches and that the

insulated joint at signal 104 is located 4 feet 6 inches west of the trolley pole on which this signal is

mounted. Assuming that train No. 729 stopped with its rear axle just clearing the insulated joint at signal

104 there would be two stop signals displayed, signal 104, located practically at the rear end of the train,

and the other, signal 108, 420 feet in rear of it; a caution indication would be displayed by signal 112, 840

feet from the rear of the train. Mr. Bell reached the scene of the accident at about 9 or 9.15 a.m., and

found that the rear end of train No. 729 after the. collision -was standing 18 feet 6 inches west of the

center line of pole 104. The automatic stop arm of signal 108 clearly showed that it had been struck by an

automatic stop valve arm, the mark being very fresh, and he removed this arm in order to preserve this

evidence. Examination of the valve arm of car 1014 also showed a fresh mark indicating that it had been in

contact with the automatic stop-arm. Except for the removal and replacement of the automatic stop arm on

pole 104 nothing had been done to the signal and automatic. stop apparatus prior to the investigation and it

had functioned properly both before and after the accident. Mr. Bell stated that the signal system had been

placed in service in 1911, and that there are approximately 18,000,000 forty-five degree movements throughout

each year. During the entire time the system has been in service only four false clear failures have, been

reported, the last of which occurred in 1916.

Master Mechanic Jackson, of the Key System Transit Company, stated that he arrived, it the scene

of the accident about one hour after it occurred; while considerable damage to equipment bad resulted from

the collision, examination disclosed nothing which would indicate that the brakes had failed to operate

properly prior to the accident. He stated that the channel iron buffer on car 665 was not overridden by the

buffer on car 1014 but was driven back over the top of the center sills, at the same time pulling in the side

angle-iron sills which prevented the sides of the car from being fanned outward by the telescoping action.

Superintendent Thornton, of the Key System, stated that on the morning of the accident trains were

being operated in their proper order. Just prior to the time of the accident switching operations at the

Pier Terminal required approaching trains to be stopped and there were two trains preceding train No. 729

which were stopped and held for that reason. He stated that he instructs train-service employees of the San

Francisco-Sacramento Railroad as to their duties on the Key Division and all motormen understand that they

are required to operate their trains tinder clear signals and that the speed of trains is dependent upon the

distance of clear vision. He stated that he impresses upon all employees the importance of observing what is

ahead of them and the fact that the responsibility in case of accident rests upon the motorman of the

following car. He had not had any trouble with Motorman Brubaker on this line except once before, on March

1, 1922, when he was involved in a rear-end collision.

General Manager Mitchell of the San Francisco-Sacramento Railroad stated that the operating

agreement between his railroad and the Key System Transit Company provides that all equipment, train crews

and passengers while on the tracks of the Key System Transit Company are entirely under the control of and

governed by the rules and regulations of the Key System Transit Company and officers thereof. New

employees of the San Francisco-Sacramento Railroad are required to report to officials of the Key System

Transit Company for examination and instructions before they are qualified for service.

Superintendent of Electric Equipment Miller of the San Francisco-Sacramento Railroad stated that

cars of the. type of ear 1014 are so geared that they can attain a maximum speed of 55 miles an hour when

operated by a propulsion current of 600 volts. After the accident the automatic stop valve was removed from

car 1014 and installed for test purposes on a similar car, No. 1012. The result of tests in each case, was

that the brakes were applied and brake-cylinder pressure of 55 pounds was obtained, the initial brake-pipe

pressure being 70 pounds; after each test a period of front 38 to 73 seconds was required for the brakes to

release.

Examination of car 1014 indicated that prior to the collision the brakes locked the wheels and

caused them to slide along the rails as all eight wheels on the car showed flat spots of front 1 inch to 1

1/4 inches in length.

ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

It is noted from the statement of Motorman Compton, of train No. 729 that he shut off power when

he first observed signal 104 in caution position and in order to bring his train to a stop made a full

service brake application when at about pole 106. He estimated that the head end of his train came to a stop

about 130 feet east of signal 100. However, in view of the length of train No. 729 and the position of the

rear end of the last car after the collision, it appears that the, head end of train No. 729 came to a stop

approximately 185 feet east of signal 100 and that therefore a distance of 430 or 440 feet was required to

make this stop.

The evidence clearly established the fact that the signal system operated properly. That signal 108

was in the stop position at the time train No. 15 passed it is conclusively established by reason of the

fact that the automatic stop valve aim engaged the trip arm operated by that signal.

The evidence also establishes the fact that the automatic stop apparatus functioned to cause an

automatic application of the brakes when train No. 15 passed signal 108, the first stop signal which it

encountered when approaching the preceding train. The very purpose of the automatic stop system which was in

service on this line is to prevent accidents of this character, and the failure of the automatic stop system

to prevent the accident in this case was due to the fact, first, that train No. 729 came to a stop at a

point which resulted in the minimum braking distance afforded by the automatic train stop devices being

provided, and, secondly, that train No. 15 was being operated at a rate of speed which required greater

braking distance than the minimum provided by the automatic stop system; a further contributing factor was

that the rails were wet and the wheels locked and slid after the brakes were applied by the operation of the

automatic stop device.

The minimum braking distance provided by the automatic stop system was based upon tests with cars

capable of attaining it maximum speed of 36 miles an hour. Train No. 15 consisted of a car capable of

attaining a maximum speed of 55 miles an hour. According to the statement of the conductor of this train,

the speed at the time the automatic stop device was operated was approximately 35 or 40 miles an hour. In

view of the fact that after the brake applications made by the motorman and by the automatic train-stop

device the car ran a distance of more than 400 feet, and collided with the preceding train at a rate of speed

variously estimated at from 20 to 30 miles an hour, the force of impact causing considerable damage to

substantially constructed cars, it is apparent that the speed of this car materially exceeded 36 miles an

hour, the maximum speed provided for by the automatic train-stop system installed on this line.

Rules governing the operation of trains under automatic block signals on this line provide that

proper operation is "to run at an even speed on a clear or proceed signal, which is the normal position of

such signal." The, rules also provide that a caution signal "means proceed with caution prepared to stop at

the next signal." It is apparent from this investigation that Motorman Brubaker failed to comply with these

rules and to control his train as required by caution and stop signals displayed for his train. There is no

evidence that the, signals were obscured by rain, but on the contrary there is direct testimony from a number

of motormen who were operating trains on this line at the time of the accident that the. signal indications

could clearly be seen for considerable distances. In view of the refusal of Motorman Brubaker to furnish

any statement in the matter, no explanation of his failure to observe and obey caution and stop signals can

be advanced.

On the portion of the line where this accident occurred there is no rule prescribing a maximum

speed limit.

CONCLUSIONS

This accident was caused by the failure of Motorman Brubaker to operate his train in accordance

with the requirements of existing rules and to observe or obey automatic block-signal indications; also by

reason of the fact that trains were operated, and were permitted to be operated at speeds which required

greater distance in which to bring them to a stop than the minimum braking distance provided by the automatic

stop system as installed on this line.

To provide against a recurrence of an accident of this character, the Key System Transit Company

should at once establish a maximum speed restriction for all trains operated over this line, which will

insure, that any train can be stopped in the minimum braking distance provided by the automatic stop system.

All of the employees involved in this accident were experienced men and none of them was on duty in

violation of any provisions of the, hours-of-service law.

Respectfully submitted.

W. P. BORLAND,

Director.

TO MY HOME PAGE